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INTRODUCTION

In response to technological change and increasing fears about the
health and environmental effects of genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) and hormonally-treated beef, there has been a general trend in
the European Community towards the adoption of administrative and
technical regulations regarding food safety. 1 As with many fears
however, this fear is an irrational one. This recent and costly trend
towards health and safety regulations that impair trade, is generally
protectionist in nature, and such laws should be repudiated and subject
to sanctions or retaliatory measures under the World Trade
Organization's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
The first part of this note will define administrative and technical
regulations and discuss recent trends toward these regulations in the
European Community. The second part will concentrate on
protectionism and analyze the negative effects of protectionism on
consumers and producers. This part will set forth four arguments
against protectionism. These four rationales can be divided into: (1)
economic rationale; (2) retaliation rationale; (3) legitimacy of
international law; and (4) purpose of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). 2 Part three will examine the current legal atmosphere
surrounding health and safety regulations. This part will examine the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (hereinafter SPS
Agreement), and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
(hereinafter TBT Agreement). Part four will address health and safety
regulations adopted by the European Union. This part will discuss four
of the major directives that have been put in place. These four directives
are: Council Directive 90/220/EEC, Commission Directive 97/35/EC,
the Novel Foods Regulation (EC) No. 258/97 and Directive
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88/146/EEC. Part five of this note will analyze the current standards
used under the SPS Agreement and then look at the standards under the
TBT Agreement. Part six will review the U.S. Supreme Court's
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence and articulate a new standard
to be used when analyzing protectionist policies in the area of
international trade. Part seven will apply the newly articulated test to
the EU directives.
I.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL REGULATIONS

A.

Definition

Administrative and technical regulations are regulations that are
placed on imports or exports by certain countries, purportedly for
health, safety and other reasons not related to protectionism. 3 This is
similar to the rationale behind the police power in American
Constitutional law. The administrative and technical regulations that
this note will focus on are those that are implemented by the European
Community, relating to the safety of certain imported foods. Examples
of these health and safety regulations include the European
Community's ban on imports of hormone-treated beef and their
regulations relating to foods that contain GMOs. 4 These import
restrictions particularly hurt the U.S. since the U.S. is one of the major
producers and exporters of foods that contain GM Os. 5 According to the
New York Times, the U.S. grows three-quarters of all genetically
modified crops. 6 Furthermore, many of the patents on genetically
modified crops are held by U.S. companies such as Monsanto, DuPont
and Dow. 7 In addition, U.S. dairy farmers use growth hormones to
improve the quality of cow meat. 8 Growth promoting hormones tend to
reduce the fat content in cows, which results in leaner meat. 9 A study
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that the economic
benefit to using growth promoters was approximately $44.21 per

3. MORDECHAI E. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: A POLICY APPROACH 147 (8th
ed. 1998).
4. Id. at 147; See generally Stewart, supra note 1.
5. Stewart, supra note 1, at 246.
6. Craig R. Whitney, The World: Fear of Feeding; Europe Loses its Appetite for High
Tech Food, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, § 4, at 3.
7. Id.
8. See Dale McNiel, The First Case Under the WTO 's Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement: The European Union's Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 89, 100 (1998).
9. Id.
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B.

General Trends toward Administrative and Technical Regulations

Over the past decade there has been a general trend in the
European Community towards the adoption of administrative and
technical regulations regarding food safety. Much of this trend is due to
environmental concerns that GMOs adversely affect the environment. 11
In addition to this, consumers are concerned about the health effects of
consuming foods that contain GMOs or growth promoting hormones. 12
These fears over GMOs could stem from a lack of confidence in the
ability of European health officials to protect the food supply. 13 Europe
has suffered from numerous instances of food contamination. After
Europe's scare with mad cow disease, it was discovered that chickens,
beef, pork, and veal might have been contaminated with cancer-causing
agents. 14 The main causes behind the contamination of meat products
were probably not GMOs but rather "adulterated animal feed." 15 In an
attempt to produce cheaper beef for consumers, farmers would enrich
their grain with ground up sheep parts, in particular sheep brain. Cows
are herbivores, and when they ingested the contaminated sheep brain,
they succumbed to a disease which looked similar to the human brain
disorder Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. 16 However, consumer fears may not
be as strong as were originally perceived. "One British retailer actually
saw its sales of tomato paste rise after disclosing that its product was
developed from GMO tomatoes." 17 There is also evidence that a desire
to protect the regional farming community from outside competition
was a major goal of banning the use of growth promoting hormones. 18
A European Parliament Committee, established to address quality
in the meat sector, concluded that '"only a total ban on the use of
growth-promoters is concordant with the strategic aims now adopted for
the Common Agricultural Policy, in particular the reduction of
surpluses and the safeguarding of a viable regionally-diversified

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

McNiel, supra note 8, at 100.
See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 1, at 290.
Id. at 294.
See Whitney, supra note 6, at 3.
Id.
Id.
16. Id.
17. Stewart & Johanson, supra note 1, at 295.
18. See McNiel, supra note 8, at 129 (quoting Committee of Inquiry into the Problem
of Quality in the Meat Sector, Draft Report on the findings of the Inquiry Committee 1 (on
file with Dale McNiel).
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farming community."' 19 This statement is a clear expression of
protectionist policies. As further evidence of these trends, the EU is
pushing for import bans on nuts, cereals and dried fruits that contain
small traces of aflotoxins, which, according to some scientists, can lead
to liver cancer in humans. 20
II.

THE EVILS OF PROTECTIONISM

A.

Definition-What is protectionism

When a law is passed that tends to impose a substantial burden on
trade that benefits local industries at the expense of foreign producers,
the law is said to be protectionist in nature. 21 This is the same as saying
that the law has a protectionist effect. 22
Where a substantial
contributing factor to a piece of legislation is to improve the economic
position of domestic industries in relation to foreign competitors the law
is said to have a protectionist purpose. 23 However, since protectionism
is generally frowned upon, very few bills explicitly advocate
protectionist policies.
This makes it necessary to look at the
surrounding context and the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether or not a law was passed with a protectionist purpose.
Protectionist effect along with legislative history and course of dealing
are a few factors that should be taken into account. Generally, a
protectionist effect is a strong indicator that the law was passed with a
protectionist purpose in mind. 24

B.

Why is protectionism problematic?

The four arguments against protectionism can be divided into: (1)
economic rationale; (2) retaliation rationale; (3) legitimacy of
international law; and (4) purpose of the WT0. 25

1.

Economic Rationale
There are two concepts of economics that are very helpful m

19. McNiel, supra note 8, at 129.
20. Geoff Winestock, Is EU's Environmental Push Protectionism? Poor Agricultural
Exporters Say Europe's Proposals Would Take Heavy Toll, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2001, at
A9.
21. See Regan, supra note 2, at 1095.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Regan, supra note 2, at 1113-14.
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analyzing the impact of protectionism on consumers and producers.
The first is the concept of efficiency and the second 'is the concept of
rent-seeking behavior. I will discuss each of these concepts in tum.
Efficiency, generall~ speaking, is when resources are used in the
most cost-effective way. 6 In other words, efficiency is achieved when
it is not possible to reallocate resources at a lower cost. 27 When
economists talk of efficiency they talk of two kinds. There is Pareto
optimality and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 28 In a Pareto optimal outcome
"the only way to make one individual better off is to make another
worse off."29 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, however, is satisfied if, in a
given situation, the gainer's gain offsets the loser's loss. 30 By reducing
the supply of the foreign item into the domestic market, protectionist
policies tend to increase the price of the foreign product relative to the
domestic product. 31 This leads to two market distortions. 32
The first of these is the production distortion. 33 This is where
domestic producers increase production of their good because they have
a relative cost advantage over foreign producers. 34 This is a distortion
because in the absence of the restriction, the domestic producer would
choose not to produce or would produce substantially less because they
would be at a comparative disadvantage relative to the foreign
producer. 35
The second distortion is the consumption distortion. 36 This occurs
because the consumer purchases more of the domestic product because
it is relatively cheaper than the foreign product. 37 This is a distortion
because without the restriction the consumer would have been better off
and would have paid a lower price by purchasing the foreign product. 38
These two distortions imply that trade regulations lead to inefficient
outcomes because resources could be reallocated to reduce costs. In
26. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 12 (3d ed. 2000).
27. Id.
28. MICHAEL L. KATZ & HARVEY S. ROSEN, MICROECONOMICS 387 (3d ed. 1998);
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 26, at 43-44.
29. Id.
30. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 26, at 44.
31. See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 218-223 (5th ed. 2000).
32. Id. at 220.
33. Id. at 223.
34. Id.
35. See generally KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 31, at 223.
36. See generally id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 220.
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other words, in a system of free trade the producer with a relative cost
advantage would produce the good and the consumer could purchase
the good at a lower price.
The next economic concept that needs to be looked at is the
concept of rent-seeking behavior. Rent-seeking behavior is behavior
whose aim is to obtain or keep the gains from certain government
policies. 39 Generally, special interest groups play a large role in the
enactment of protectionist policies.40 The problem with rent-seeking
behavior is that even if protectionist policies increase the national
welfare of a country, which usually occurs only in rare theoretical
scenarios, most of the benefits are extracted by the special interest
groups rather than consumers. 41

2.

Retaliation

Regulations that impair trade tend to cause resentment and hostility
towards the country implementing the policies. 42 This generally leads
the country whose exports are restricted to impose retaliatory tariffs or
quotas on goods from the regulating country, hence inducing a perilous
cycle which, more often than not, results in a trade war between the two
countries. 43 The global response to the Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930 is an
example of retaliation. This Act substantially raised U.S. tariffs on
imported goods. In response to this, Australia, Canada, Cuba, France,
Italy, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain followed suit by raising their
tariffs. 44 Trade wars, such as these, tend to be inefficient because
resources are frittered away in an attempt to harm other countries. This
in turn harms global consumers by raising the prices of imports relative
to domestic goods thereby creating a consumption distortion.

3.

Legitimacy of International Law

International law has been a source of criticism by scholars as
being irrelevant. Many scholars have viewed international law as a set
of non-binding norms that states adhere to only when it is in their best
interests to do so. 45 This statement is correct, however, many scholars
39. KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 28, at 459.
40. KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 31, at 221.
41. Id.
42. Regan, supra note 2, at 1114.
43. Id.
44. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 778 (2002).
45. See generally id. at 909-11 (discussing the legitimacy and "relevance" of
international law).
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overlook the fact that it is in a state's best interest to have a set of
binding international rules to ensure global stability. Since states will
act in their best interests, in most instances states will adhere to
international law. As Louis Henkin stated, "almost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations, almost all of the time."46 When nations do violate their
international obligations it is the job of international law to hold them
accountable.
International trade law prohibits the implementation of certain
policies that either expressly interfere with free trade or have the effect
of interfering with free trade. 47 The SPS Agreement allows countries to
enact health and safety regulations on the condition that they are not
disguised barriers to trade and that they are scientifically justified.48
The comment to § 805 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law notes that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
"proscribes requirements of local law that have the purpose and effect
of excluding imports."49
When countries impair trade by invoking the police power, the
spirit of the WTO and international trade law is violated. The spirit of
the WTO calls for trade liberalization and the reduction of all trade ·
barriers. 50 Therefore, allowing countries to implement health and safety
regulations that have the purpose and effect of discriminating against
foreign producers is directly contrary to international law. If such
measures are in fact protectionist and are allowed to stand, the
credibility of international law as a set of rules governing the
international community would be substantially impaired.

4.

Purpose of the WTO

Prior to the formation of the WTO, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade was the primary agreement governing trade disputes.
The GA TT was created to promote international trade and reduce trade
barriers. In the years leading up to the great depression, many countries
had very isolationist and mercantilist trade policies, characterized by
high tariffs and import quotas. Following the Smoot-Hawley tariffs
there was a sharp decline in international trade, which could have

46. DUNOFF ET.AL., supra note 44, at 972.
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 805 (1987).
48. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994 [hereinafter SPS Agreement], Annex IA, art. 2, paras. 1, 3.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 47.
50. DUNOFF ET.AL., supra note 44, at 778.
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contributed to the severity of the great depression. The GA TT was
agreed to as a way of combating these isolationist tendencies and
increasing the free flow of goods and services. In 1995, the WTO was
created through a series of agreements known collectively as the
Uruguay Round Agreement. As part of this agreement a dispute
settlement body was created to resolve trade disputes and impose
sanctions on violators.s 1
One of the stated purposes of the World Trade Organization is to
substantially reduce "tariffs and other barriers to trade and to ..."
eliminate "discriminatory treatment in international trade relations."s 2
Protectionist policies discriminate against out of state producers and
therefore defy the very purpose of the WTO.
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING HEALTH AND
SAFETY REGULATIONS

A.

The SPS Agreement

The SPS Agreement was signed as part of the Uruguay Round
Agreement. s3 The SPS Agreement allows member states to adopt
certain measures that are designed to protect the health and safety of
their citizens. s4 These measures are called sanitary and phytosanitary
measures.ss These measures are limited to the extent that they are not
applied in a manner which would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between members where the same conditions prevail, or
a "disguised restriction on international trade. "s 6 There were four
enumerated goals of the SPS Agreement. First, the SPS Agreement was
designed to establish rules and procedures for "the adoption,
development and enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary
measures."s 7 The second enumerated goal was to liberalize trade by
reducing the "negative effects ... on international trade and preventing

51. See DUNOFF ET.AL., supra note 44, at 778-79 (discussing the evolution of the WTO
and the historical atmosphere behind its creation).
52. Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
Legal Instruments- Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1144, available at
http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/docs_e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2004) [hereinafter
WTO Agreement].
53. See McNiel, supra note 8, at 95.
54. See generally SPS Agreement, supra note 48.
55. Id.
56. Id. at art. 2, para. 3.
57. McNiel, supra note 8, at 95.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss1/6

8

Nelson: The Police Powers: A Pretext For Protectionism?

2004]

The Police Powers

171

the use of such measures as disguised barriers to trade. " 58 Third, the
SPS Agreement was intended to harmonize safety measures to comport
with prevailing international standards such as those adopted by the
Codex Alimentarius Commission. 59 Finally, the fourth goal was to
require sound scientific justifications for the proposed phytosanitary
measures. 60
The SPS Agreement also calls for a risk assessment mechanism
that requires members to assess risk in accordance with prevailing risk
assessment techniques adopted by the "relevant international
organizations."61 In assessing these risks, members must look at
potential economic harm caused by the entry of the altered food into the
market, the spread of disease, costs of control or eradication and the
relative cost differences of other alternatives. 62 The Agreement also
states that "[m]embers shall ensure that such measures are not more
trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection ...."63 If there are other measures
that would achieve the same level of protection then the measure is
more restrictive than necessary. 64
B.

The TBT Agreement

This agreement provides that countries may implement technical
regulations that serve "legitimate objectives" as long as the regulations
are "not .. . more trade restrictive than necessary." 65 "Legitimate
objective[s]" include the "protection of human health or safety, animal
or plant life or health, or the environment."66
IV. EU LEGISLATION

The European Union has adopted, and is in the process of
adopting, many administrative and technical regulations regarding
health and safety. I will discuss four of the major directives that have
been put in place.
The first directive is Council Directive 90/220/EEC, adopted by

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

McNiel, supra note 8, at 95.
Id. at 96.
Id.
SPS Agreement, supra note 48, at art. 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at art. 5, n.3.
Stewart & Johanson, supra note 1, at 288.
Id.
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the Council of Ministers on April 23, 1990. 67 Directive 90/220/EEC is
aimed primarily at raw materials that contain genetically modified
organisms. 68 Under this directive, the manufacturer of a GMO is
required to notify the authorities of the state in which the product will
be first sold. 69 Included in the notification, must be the scientific name
of the GMO, possible environmental hazards relating to the product,
and potential health risks of the GM0. 70 Moreover, a risk assessment
must be done evaluating the possible health risks and environmental
risks associated with releasing the product into the market. 71
The next directive is Commission Directive 97/35/EC, which
amended 90/220/EEC.
This directive amended 90/220/EEC by
requiring labeling of "products that contain, or may contain, GMOs." 72
The "may contain" provision comes into effect when GMO products are
mixed with non-GMO products. 73
Moreover, the Novel Foods Regulation, (EC) No. 258/97, applies
to foods that are sold as final goods that contain GMOs. 74 It also covers
food produced b~ GMOs even though the product does not contain any
such organisms. 5 This regulation also requires the producer of the
questionable product to notify the authorities of the state in which the
product will be first sold. 76 In addition, this regulation requires the
labeling of a product that may contain GMOs. 77 Furthermore, Directive
88/146/EEC banned the importation of beef treated with growthpromoting hormones. 78
V.

CURRENT STANDARDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

When looking at the standards under the SPS, the dispute between
the United States and the EU over the EU' s ban on hormonally treated
beef is illustrative. Directive 88/146/EEC banned the importation of

67. Stewart & Johanson, supra note 1, at 256.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 257.
70. Id.
71. Stewart & Johanson, supra note 1, at 257.
72. Id. at 268.
73. Id. at 270.
74. Id. at 256
75. Stewart & Johanson, supra note 1, at 278.
76. Id. at 279.
77. Id. at 280.
78. WTO Dispute Settlement Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Report], at 175 (Aug. 18, 1977),
available at 1997 WTO DS LEXIS 28.
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beef treated with any one of five different growth-promoting
hormones. 79 The United States claimed that the ban was inconsistent
with the SPS Agreement and the WTO agreed. 80 After hearing much
testimony by scientific experts on the effects of the hormonally-treated
beef, the first issue the DSB addressed was whether or not the SPS
Agreement even applied. 81 The DSB set forth two requirements that
need to be satisfied in order for the agreement to apply. 82 First, "the
measure in dispute is a sanitary or phytosanitary measure." 83 Sanitary
or phytosanitary measures include "all relevant laws, decrees,
regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end
product criteria" that are "directly related to food safety."84 In other
words, the challenged measure must be designed to "protect human or
animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks
arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing
organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs . . . ." 85 Second, "the
measure in dispute may, directly or indirectly, affect international
trade." 86 After concluding that the SPS Agreement did apply, the DSB
broke the SPS Agreement down into three parts. First, they looked at
whether the EU measure in dispute was governed by international
standards and if it was, whether the measure comports to or was based
on such standards. 87 Second, if there were international standards, but
the directive was not based on them, then the inquiry becomes whether
"the European Communities can justify its measures under Article
3.3 ...." 88 Article 3.3 requires the party imposing the regulation to
demonstrate that there is a "scientific justification" for the regulation or
that the measures comply with Article 5. 89 A scientific justification
exists, if on the basis of available scientific information, the member
determines that the existing standards are not enough to protect the
health and safety of its citizens. 90 Third, if no international standards
exist, the regulatory measures must comport with Article 3.1 of the SPS

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 78, at 175.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 202.
Id.
Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 78, at 202.
SPS Agreement, supra note 48, at Annex A, ~ 1.
McNiel, supra note 8, at 113 (quoting SPS Agreement, at Annex A,~ 1).
Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 78, at~ 8.45, at 202.
Id. at~ 8.45, at 208-09.
Id. at~ 8.46, at 209.
SPS Agreement, supra note 48, at art. 3.3.
Id. at 3 n.2.
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Agreement. 91
Furthermore, in a claim alleging a violation of the SPS Agreement
the complainant must show a prima facie violation of the Agreement. 92
Once a prima facie case has been established the burden shifts to the
respondent, to rebut these allegations. 93
The DSB found that there were international standards but the
regulation did not comply with those standards. 94 The DSB then looked
at Article 3.3 and also Article 5 to determine whether the regulations
violated the agreement. 95
Article 5 requires a risk assessment to determine the appropriate
level of protection. 96 This article requires members to weigh the costs
and benefits of the regulation. 97 The members must take into account
the negative effects the regulation could have on trade, as well as "the
potential damage in terms of loss production or sales in the event of the
entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control
or eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and the relative
cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks."98
Furthermore, Article 5.6 requires members to ensure that their policies
are "not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. " 99 If there is another
measure that can achieve the same level of protection, then the disputed
measure is more trade-restrictive than necessary. 100 The DSB interprets
Article 5 to require the identification of adverse effects on human health
due to the hormones and the probability of occurrence of these
effects. 101 After looking at all these factors, the court concluded that the
regulations were in violation of the SPS Agreement. 102
In summary, when analyzing a regulation under the SPS
Agreement, the first step is to determine whether the regulation in
dispute complies with current international standards. 103 If there are

91. See Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 78, ~ 8.47, at 209.
92. Id. at~ 8.51.
93. Id. at 212.
94. Id. ~ 8.89, at 245.
95. Id. 1/ 8.89, at 245-46.
96. See generally SPS Agreement, supra note 48, at art. 5.
97. Id.
98. Id. note 48, at arts. 5.3-5.4.
99. Id. at art. 5.6.
100. Id. at art. 5.6, n. 3.
101. Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 78, ~ 8.89, at 251.
102. Id.,~ 8.159, at 306.
103. Id. at~ 8.45, at 208-09.
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current international standards but the regulations are not based on
them, the next step is to determine whether the European Community
can justify its regulations under Article 3.3. 104 This requires either a
scientific justification for the measures or that the measures comply
with the risk assessment provisions of Article 5. 105 Lastly if no
international standards exist, then the regulatory measures must comply
with Article 3.1 of the Agreement. 106 The initial burden of proof is on
the complainant to show a prima facie violation of the SPS
Agreement. 107 Once the complainant carries the initial burden the
burden shifts to the respondent to rebut the allegations. 108
There has not been much discussion about the standards under the
TBT Agreement. The TBT Agreement does allow countries to impose
regulations that serve "legitimate objectives" as long as the regulations
are "not more trade restrictive than necessary." 109 Under the TBT,
legitimate objectives constitute the "protection of human health or
safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment." 110 Due to the
absence of litigation interpreting the TBT Agreement, there will likely
be further litigation on what standards apply and when the TBT
Agreement is applicable to such disputes.
VI.
A.

ANEWSTANDARD

Review of U.S. Supreme Court dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence

A look into the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the dormant
commerce clause gives valuable insight into trade between nations.
There are a number of similarities between the two areas. Both involve
regulations that are purportedly designed to protect the health and
welfare of their citizens. Both involve effects on trade between two
sovereign or in the case of states (in the U.S. federalist structure), quasisovereign territories. The underlying principle that ties the two subjects
together is a desire for free mobility of goods and services.
The first illustrative case is City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey. 111

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 78, ~ 8.46, at 209.
SPS Agreement, supra note 48, at art. 3.3.
Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 78, at art. 3.3.
Id. at~ 8.51, at 211.
Id. at~ 103.
Stewart & Johanson, supra note 1, at 288.
WTO Agreement, supra note 52, at art. 2.2.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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In that case the Supreme Court struck down a New Jersey law that
prohibited the importation of most "solid or liquid" waste which
originated or was collected outside of the state. 112 The statute was
passed in response to a legislative concern regarding the scarcity of
landfill sites within New Jersey and the corresponding threat to the
environment. 113 The avowed purpose of the statute was to protect the
environment and to safeguard the "public health, safety and welfare" of
New Jersey citizens. 114
This law affected private landfill operators in New Jersey and
elsewhere by reducing the supply of out of state waste and therefore
increasing the price of domestic waste. 115 In the absence of the
legislation, out of state collectors of waste would compete with in-state
collectors; therefore, resulting in lower costs of disposal. Thus, the
legislation benefits in-state collectors .by shielding them from out of
state competition, which results in a higher cost of disposal. This
evidently harms private landfill operators in New Jersey because they
have to pay a higher price for the waste. 116
The Court concluded that the statute violated the dormant
commerce clause because the statute discriminated against an article of
commerce merely because of its origin. 117 The Court stated that,
"where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation a
virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected." 118 However,
nondiscriminatory regulations that incidentally burden interstate
commerce, and whose purpose is to safeguard the health and welfare of
citizens will be upheld, "unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 119
The Court reasoned that the New Jersey statute discriminated
against out-of-state waste collectors, merely because of their origin, so
the statute was per se invalid. 120 In practical effect, the Court's holding
implies that regulations that have the effect of discriminating against
out-of-state producers and that benefit in state producers at the expense
of out of state producers are presumed to be invalid unless the state

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See generally City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 619, 626.
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 627.
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imposing the restriction can offer a nondiscriminatory justification. 121
The Court stated, "But whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may
not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce
coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from
their origin, to treat them differently." 122 The Court, however,
dismissed the avowed purpose of the legislature of protecting the
environment and the public welfare and, as a result, subjected the
regulation to a per se rule of invalidity.
In the case of C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, NY., 123
the Court struck down a city ordinance which required those wishing to
dispose of waste in Clarkstown to take the waste to a local processing
plant which charged a disposal fee that was higher than the market
price. 124 The city ordinance at issue was called the "flow control
ordinance" and it required all local solid waste to be processed through
the waste transfer station before leaving the city. 125 The town built the
transfer station at a cost of $1.4 million and entered into a contract with
a private contractor who agreed to construct the facility and operate it
for a five-year period. 126 After the five-year period was over the town
would buy the station for a nominal fee (i.e., $1 ). 127 The town sought to
amortize the cost of the plant by guaranteeing a minimum waste flow
and charging a fee of $81. 128 In effect the state established a private
monopoly.
The "flow control ordinance" had the effect of harming local waste
processing companies who were required to bring their nonrecyclable
waste to the transfer station and pay the fee. In the absence of the
ordinance, the companies would have shipped the nonrecyclable waste
to whichever processing station charged a lower fee. 129 Additionally,
the "flow control ordinance drives up the cost for out-of-state interests
to dispose of their solid waste." 130
The town argued that the purpose of the statute was to ensure the
"safe handling and proper treatment of solid waste." 131 They argued

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27.
Id.
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383 (1984).
See generally id.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 387.
Id.
C &A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 389.
Id. at393.
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that the ordinance was necessary to achieve this objective because of the
reduction in landfill space and the escalation of environmental cleanup
costs. 132
The Court paid little attention to the Town's argument and instead
concluded that the statute was per se invalid because it discriminated
against out-of-state processors by driving up the cost of disposal and
depriving them "of access to a local market." 133 The Court once again
reaffirmed the rule that "discrimination against interstate commerce in
favor of local business or investment is per se invalid, save in a narrow
class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous
scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local
interest." 134 In other words, where a statute discriminates against out of
state interests in favor of local interests, the law bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity .13 5 In analyzing whether the ordinance is
protectionist the court once ·again looks toward the discriminatory
effects of the ordinance. 136 "Our initial discussion of the effects of the
ordinance on interstate commerce goes far toward refuting the town's
contention that there is no discrimination in its regulatory scheme." 137
In C& A Carbone, as in City of Philadelphia, the Court looks at the
discriminatory effects of the ordinance. If the ordinance benefits local
producers at the expense of out of state producers, the law is per se
invalid, unless it can be shown that a legitimate local interest is at stake
and there are no other means to advance that interest.
Another case that is illustrative is West-Lynn Creamery v. Healy. 138
In that case the Court held a Massachusetts program unconstitutional,
where it taxed all milk sales in the state and subsidized Massachusetts
milk producers from the proceeds. 139 The law at issue required all milk
dealers in the state to pay a "monthly premium payment" into the
"Massachusetts Dairy Equalization Fund," the proceeds of which went
to Massachusetts dairy farmers. 140
The legislation was passed in response to low milk prices, brought
on by low-cost producers in states neighboring Massachusetts. 141 The
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392-93.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id. at 390.
C &A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390.
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
See generally id.
Id. at 190-91.
Id. at 189.
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avowed purpose of the legislation, as stated by the Governor of
Massachusetts, was to "preserve our local industry, maintain reasonable
minimum prices for the dairy farmers, thereby ensure a continuous and
adequate supply of fresh milk for our market, and protect the public
health [emphasis added]." 142
The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional on the grounds that
the avowed purpose and the effect of the statute were protectionist in
nature and therefore per se invalid. 143 Once again the Court placed a
heavy emphasis on the effect of the statute when determining whether
or not it was protectionist and hence per se invalid. 144 In articulating
this position the court relied on the case of Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., where the court struck down a New York statute that established a
"single minimum price for all milk, whether produced in New York or
elsewhere." 145 Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, stated that
"neither the power to tax nor the police power [emphasis added] may be
used by the state of destination with the aim and effect of establishing
an economic barrier against competition with the products of another
state or the labor of its residents." 146 In West Lynn Creamery, the court
reasoned that the Massachusetts pricing order would have the effect of
discriminating against out-of-state producers of milk in favor of in-state
producers. 147 The Court further argued that "this effect renders the
program unconstitutional, because it, like a tariff, 'neutraliz[es]
advantages belonging to the place of origin. "' 148
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, the Court upheld a
Maryland law that prohibited downstream vertical integration in the
petroleum products market, and which required "producers or refiners
of petroleum products" to offer price reductions to independent retail
stations in an attempt to reduce the harmful effects of local
competition. 149
The Court found that there was no discriminatory effect and
therefore, the law was valid. 150 The court distinguished Exxon from
City of Philadelphia, Carbone, and West Lynn, on the grounds that the
statute at issue did not create any "barriers whatsoever against interstate
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 190.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 194.
West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 196-201.
Id. at 196.
See Exxon Corp. v. Governor ofMd., 437 U.S. 117, 119-20, 122-23 (1978).
Id. at 126.
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independent dealers; it does not prohibit the flow of interstate goods,
place added costs upon them, or distinguish between in-state and out-ofstate companies in the retail market." 151 Exxon reaffirmed the rule that
laws that have protectionist effects are per se invalid. 152 The difference
was that in Exxon, the Court found no such discriminatory effect, and
hence the Court upheld the statute. 153
The final case that deserves discussion is Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission. 154 In that case the court struck down a
North Carolina law that required all closed containers of apples sold or
shipped into the state to bear "no grade ... other than the applicable
U.S. grade." 155
Washington State, at the time, was the nation's largest apple
producer. 156 As such, it placed a high emphasis on quality and it created
its own agency in charge of quality, advertisement and promotion of its
apples. 157 The Commission had their own private labeling system,
which identified the apples as meeting the quality requirements imposed
by the State of Washington. 158 The North Carolina law at issue
prohibited all closed containers of apples from carrying state
gradings. 159 This law was very costly to Washington apple producers
because it either required them to "obliterate the printed labels on
containers shipped to North Carolina, thus giving their product a
damaged appearance," or to change " ... their marketing practices to
accommodate the needs of the North Carolina market." 160
The stated purpose of the legislation was to protect consumers by
eliminating deceptive practices and false or misleading labels. 161 The
state maintained that the law at issue was a valid exercise of the state's
police powers to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. 162
The Court found that the statute clearly benefited local apple
producers at the expense of Washington State apple producers, by

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 126.
Id.
Id.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm 'n, 432 U.S. 333, 335, 354 (1977).
Id. at 335, 354.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 336-37.
Id. at 336.
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 337.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 349.
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increasing the cost of doing business in North Carolina. 163 The court
reasoned that since there was a protectionist effect, North Carolina had
the burden of showing that the statute served legitimate local interests
and that there were other nondiscriminatory means that could have
served that purpose. 164 According to the Court, North Carolina failed to
carry that burden. 165
In summary, after reviewing the Supreme Court'sjurisprudence in
the area of state economic protectionism, there is one recurring theme:
the ability of states to trade freely with one another without legislative
interference. The Court has placed a special emphasis on the evils of
economic protectionism. "The central rationale for the rule against
discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is
local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies
and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent." 166
The general rule that can be extracted from the foregoing cases is this:
where a state law or ordinance has the effect of discriminating against
interstate commerce, by benefiting local producers at the expense of
out-of-state producers, the law is per se invalid, unless the state can
show that the law serves a legitimate local interest and there is no
nondiscriminatory way to further that interest. However, in practical
effect, if it can be shown that the law has a protectionist effect, it will
likely be declared invalid, regardless of the avowed purpose. In most of
the foregoing cases in which the law was struck down, the state
legislature argued that the law was enacted to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens or to protect the environment. Once the Court
determined that there was a protectionist effect, the Court gave a
cursory glance at the purpose and declared the statute unconstitutional.
As stated in Best & Co. v. Maxwell, "The commerce clause forbids
discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious. In each case it is our
duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name
may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against
interstate commerce." 167

163. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350-51.
164. Id. at 353.
165. Id.
166. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390; see The Federalist No. 22, pp. 143-45 (Clinton.
Rossiter ed., 1961) (Alexander. Hamilton); JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of
the United States, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 362-363 (G. Hunt ed., 1901).
167. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311U.S.454, 455-56 (1940).
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Supreme Court v. International Law

Under current international law, countries are free to adopt health
and safety measures as long as they comply with international standards
and/or are based on sound scientific justifications or risk assessments. 168
Under this standard, policies that have protectionist effects, but are
based on "sound science" or risk assessments are not violations of
international law. The practical effect of this standard is to allow
countries to protect local enterprises from foreign competition while
using the "public health and welfare" as a pretext. In other words, the
current standard is underprotective of international trade. Whenever
countries want to protect local industries from outside competition they
can merely invoke the police power as a rationale. The way the current
standards apply it would be very costly to challenge the trade restrictive
policy. Each side needs to gather enough scientific evidence and
testimony to show the scientific validity of the regulation. Furthermore,
what happens if current scientific knowledge is such that the affects of a
given product or technique have not yet been ascertained? The current
standard sets up a costly and complex set of rules that make it easier for
countries to impose trade restrictions.
Additionally, the current international standards require judges and
other legal scholars to delve into a realm of knowledge in which they
are not overtly familiar and/or trained. Judges are required to analyze
the scientific justifications for certain policies; something they are not
well equipped to do. Furthermore, when scientists cannot agree on the
health effects of GM Os, how are judges supposed to reach a consensus?
The scientific community has not reached a consensus as to whether or
not GMOs are harmful to human health or to plant and animal
life. 169Additionally, any health or environmental benefits that do accrue
because of the GMO regulations will be realizable at some point in the
future, whereas the costs imposed on foreign exporters occur in the
present. Hence, the marginal discounted benefit of the gains from the
regulations will likely be substantially less than the marginal discounted
cost imposed on foreign producers and domestic consumers. The
current standard under the SPS Agreement is a poor standard because it
imposes high transaction costs on the parties who seek to litigate and
the standard does not clearly set forth a rule that states can abide by
when setting their trade policies.
A better standard would be one similar to that laid out by the U.S.

168. See generally SPS Agreement, supra note 48.
169. A not-so-perfect market, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2000.
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Supreme Court in their dormant commerce clause cases.
For
convenience I will call this standard the protectionist effects test. If a
law has a protectionist effect (i.e., if the effect of the law is to benefit
local producers at the expense of foreign producers), then there is a
heavy presumption that it is invalid. The only way for this presumption
to be rebutted is if the enacting state or country can show that the law
serves a legitimate local concern and there are no other nonprotectionist
measures to achieve the same ends. A mere stated purpose that the law
is intended to protect the health and welfare of its citizens is not
sufficient. Discrimination in international trade should be outlawed
"whether forthright or ingenious." 170
A standard such as this would reduce transaction costs by reducing
the need for extensive scientific testimony and research. Additionally,
it would allow judges to do what they are trained to do, apply law.
Furthermore, a standard such as this would be more consistent with the
purposes of the WTO. The purpose of the WTO is to reduce trade
barriers and to encourage free trade among countries. 171 What better
way is there to encourage trade than to outlaw policies that have a
protectionist effect? Moreover, such a clear standard gives an incentive
to countries to be careful when enacting policies that may be
protectionist in nature.
VII. APPLICATION OF THE PROTECTIONIST EFFECTS TEST TO EC
DIRECTIVES

A.

Directive 901220/EEC

Under this directive, the manufacturer (exporter, in the case of the
U.S.) or importer of a GMO is required to notify the authorities of the
state in which the product will be first sold. 172 Included in this
notification must be a risk assessment of possible environmental or
health risks and the scientific name of the GM0. 173
This law would have the effect of increasing production costs for
U.S. exporters who use GMOs in their products. On its face this law is
not protectionist. However, combined with the fact that many U.S.
products are produced using GMOs, whereas many products produced
within the European Union do not use GMOs, there is clearly a

170.
171.
172.
173.

Best & Co., 311 U.S. at 455.
WTO Agreement, supra note 52.
Stewart & Johanson, supra note 1, at 257.
Id.
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protectionist effect. The law benefits local farmers by insulating them
from foreign competition.
Additionally, under the Common
Agricultural Policy, the EU has maintained a policy of subsidizing local
farmers to protect them from outside competition. 174 Under the
protectionist effects test this directive should constitute a barrier to trade
and should be subject to WTO sanctions.
B.

Commission Directive 97135/EC, amending 901220/EEC

This directive requires the labeling of "products that contain, or
may contain, GMOs." 175 For the same reasons as the previous directive
this one should be considered a trade barrier and subject to sanctions.
As in Hunt, this labeling requirement would impose substantial costs on
foreign producers who would have to change their marketing practices
to accommodate the wishes of the domestic market. 176 This labeling
requirement benefits local producers by insulating them from low-cost
foreign production. Therefore, the requirement has a discriminatory
effect and should be a per se violation of international law under the
protectionist effects test.
C.

The Novel Foods Regulation: EC No. 258197

As mentioned earlier, this act contains notification provisions that
are similar to those that are set forth in 90/220/EEC. 177 The act also
requires the labeling of foods that may contain GMOs. 178 The same
reasoning applies when analyzing this directive. The law has a probable
protectionist effect and is therefore a per se violation of international
law.
D.

Directive 881146/EEC

This directive banned the importation of beef treated with growthpromoting hormones. 179 This directly impacts United States exporters.
As earlier stated, the economic benefit to using growth promoters was
approximately $44.21 per animal. 18 Furthermore, U.S. exporters use
growth promoters more frequently than do European dairy farmers.
This imposes a discriminatory effect on U.S. beef exporters by raising

°
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supra note 3, at 185.
Stewart & Johanson, supra note 1, at 268.
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 338.
Stewart & Johanson, supra note 1, at 279.
Id. at 280.
Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 78.
McNiel, supra note 8, at 100.
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the cost of doing business in Europe. This directive was even a more
clear cut case of economic protectionism because the directive had an
inherently protectionist legislative purpose. As was stated by the
European Parliament when enacting this legislation, "only a total ban on
the use of growth-promoters is concordant with the strategic aims now
adopted for the Common Agricultural Policy, in particular the reduction
of surpluses and the safeguarding of a viable regionally diversified
farming community." 181 This is a clear-cut case of a protectionist
purpose and effect. This directive was eventually held to be in violation
of the SPS Agreement and hence a violation of international law. 182
Instead of delving into the scientific justifications of the directive,
which obviously was a costly and time-consuming procedure, a mere
look at its purpose and possible effects reveal its protectionist nature.
CONCLUSION

The "health and safety" regulations enacted by the European Union
have the effect of discriminating against foreign producers and
exporters. Furthermore, the means adopted by the EU are more trade
restrictive than necessary to achieve the desired ends. Moreover, a look
into the circumstances surrounding the regulations and statements made
by the parliament indicate that the regulations were passed in an attempt
to protect the local farming industry against outside competition.
Therefore, under the protectionist effects test the EU regulations violate
international law and should be repudiated or subject to sanctions.
The European regulations raise the cost of doing business for
foreign producers. This raises the price of imported products relative to
domestic products. It follows that consumers will substitute away from
the more expensive import into the cheaper domestic product.
Furthermore, domestic producers will increase production because they
have a relative cost advantage over foreign producers. Therefore, the
European regulations are inefficient because they create both a
production distortion and a consumption distortion.
Additionally, the EU could have imposed less trade restrictive
measures to achieve the same goal. As noted earlier, many of the
health-related problems associated with meat are due to the adulterated
feed. If the European lawmakers were truly concerned about the
welfare of their citizens they would prohibit farmers from using ground
up sheep in their feed. However, using this type of feed is relatively

181. McNiel, supra note 8,. at 129.
182. See Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 78, at 73, 74.
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cheaper than unadulterated feed. Due to the strong influence of the
farm lobby in the European Union, the Parliament would rather impose
trade restrictions in the form of administrative regulations, than increase
the cost to domestic farmers. The EU could impose strict regulations on
domestic farmers that would have a minimal effect on international
trade but would protect the health and safety of Europe's citizens.
Moreover, the EU has had a history of using import quotas, tariffs
and export subsidies to help domestic farmers at the expense of foreign
competitors. Under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the EU
uses price supports, import restrictions and export subsidies to insulate
domestic farmers from competition. 183
From the foregoing it is clear that the EU directives arbitrarily
discriminate against local producers, the means used are more trade
restrictive than necessary and the history of the EU indicates a
protectionist purpose behind the directives. Although, under the
protectionist effects test only a protectionist effect needs to be shown,
these directives clearly do not withstand scrutiny because they have a
protectionist purpose and effect.
The WTO was established to reduce tariffs and to encourage free
trade. 184 The principle behind this, being that when people and
countries are free to pursue their own interest, an equilibrium will be
reached whereby all people are better off. International trade is not a
zero-sum game. Just because someone gains does not imply that
someone necessarily loses. Imposing costly and in some cases
prohibitive regulations on the ability of nations to trade does not just
benefit local producers but it harms those very people that the
legislation is supposedly trying to protect. It harms the nation's citizens
by reducing the availability of necessities and by increasing their prices.
This very fact implies that the regulations and directives imposed by the
European Community are not really an attempt to improve the health
and welfare of their citizens; they are merely an attempt to protect local
producers from the rigors of competition.
The current standards under the SPS Agreement are inefficient
because they impose high transaction costs upon the parties involved.
Furthermore, the standards require judges to delve into a realm of
scientific knowledge that they are not that familiar with. Moreover,
given the current scientific uncertainty regarding the health and
environmental effects of GMOs it will be increasingly difficult for

183. KREININ,supra note 3, at 185.
184. WTO Agreement, supra note 52.
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judges to reach a consensus. Additionally, the discounted benefits due
to the GMO regulations will likely be less than the present costs
incurred by foreign producers. Hence, the current standard should be
replaced by a standard that is more efficient, has lower transaction costs
and is more judicially manageable. A better standard would be that
imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in their dormant commerce clause
cases. This "protectionist effects" standard would impose a heavy
presumption of invalidity on laws that have a protectionist effect. A
standard such as this would reduce transaction costs and would make it
easier for judges to apply the law. This standard would make it more
difficult for states to enact protectionist measures using the police
powers as a pretext. This would increase international trade and benefit
global consumers by reducing the price of goods and services.
In conclusion, where a statute has a protectionist effect it should be
declared a per se violation of international trade. Furthermore, many of
the regulations that have been adopted by the European Community
have such a protectionist effect, and should therefore, be repudiated and
subject to sanctions by the WTO.
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